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HOW TEXTUALISM HAS CHANGED THE 
CONVERSATION IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Jesse D.H. Snyder* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Elena Kagan announced, “we’re all textualists now,” during
a lecture in November 2015 at Harvard Law School.1  That remark in 
part reflected how far the textualist movement had come in the 
Supreme Court since Justice Antonin Scalia began fomenting its 
virtues as early as 1986.2  And it was a comment offered en passant 
in a larger conversation without an air of triumphalism or poignant 
lament.  The comment also occurred just months after the Supreme 
Court released King v. Burwell, in which the Court concluded that the 
phrase “an Exchange established by the State,” when interpreted in 
proper context to advance the overall statutory scheme, embraces a 
broader meaning, whereby enabling the federal government to 
establish exchanges as well.3  So when Justice Kagan made that 
* 2016–2017 Law Clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Jimmie V.
Reyna of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 2012–2013 Law Clerk to
the Honorable Jorge A. Solis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas.  I earned my J.D., summa cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan University and my
B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy.  I would like to thank the entire staff
of the University of Baltimore Law Review, including especially Caitlin A. Rayhart,
Matthew L. Allison, Adrianne C. Blake, Emily Schmidt, and Andrew Berg.  I would
also like to give a warm shout-out to my wife, Amy, for her support and
encouragement.
1. The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
HARVARD LAW TODAY 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-
lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation/ (explaining that “the primary reason”
Justice Scalia will “go down as one of the most important, most historic figures in the
Court” is that he “taught everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently”);
id. at 8:28 (“I think we’re all textualists now in a way that just was not remotely true
when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”).
2. See generally id.
3. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health 
insurance markets, not to destroy them.   If at all possible, we 
must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, 
and avoids the latter.  Section 36B can fairly be read consistent 
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statement, it was uncertain what she meant and to whom she was 
referring.  But in view of some of the dissents she joined in October 
Term 2017, perhaps not even she understood the gravity of that 
statement or how the Court constituted years later would instantiate 
that idea.4   
The first opinion released in October Term 2018 offers a blueprint 
for what it means to be a textualist in the Supreme Court three years 
after Justice Kagan’s remarks, and it offers a glimpse into what might 
be the new norm for how the Court interprets statutes.  This norm 
demonstrates a interpretative shift from context and purpose to the 
words themselves tout court.5  In Mount Lemmon Fire District v. 
Guido, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg hemmed a circuit split in a crisp 
8-to-0 decision, cabining the Court’s analysis to the statutory text to
decide whether public employees could sue state and local employers
of less than 20 employees on allegations of age discrimination.6  A
public fire district had laid off its two oldest firefighters and then
sought to dismiss an eventual lawsuit on the basis that the fire district
was too small to qualify as an “employer,” which federal law defined
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty or more employees,” with the added proviso that “[t]he term
[employer] also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State
or political subdivision of a State . . . .”7  In a slip opinion barely
reaching the top of the seventh page, the unanimous decision all but
limited its focus to the text in deciding that the term “also” removes
the numerical requirement to be an employer under the statute.8
Passing reference to some enforcement evidence provided a coda to a
decision otherwise unabated by extratextual arguments.9  Perhaps
with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we 
adopt. 
Id. at 2496. 
4. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018) (“What all these
textual and contextual clues indicate, our precedents confirm.  In many cases over
many years, this Court has heard and rejected efforts to conjure conflicts between the
Arbitration Act and other federal statutes.”); id. at 1638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In
face of the NLRA’s text, history, purposes, and longstanding construction, the Court
nevertheless concludes that collective proceedings do not fall within the scope of § 7.
None of the Court’s reasons for diminishing § 7 should carry the day.”).
5. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 24 (2018) (“‘[T]wenty or more
employees’ is confining language, but the confinement is tied to § 630(b)’s first
sentence, and does not limit the ADEA’s governance of the employment practices of
States and political subdivisions thereof.”).
6. See id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
8. Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 25–26.
9. See id. at 27.
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because of the quotidian context of the underlying dispute, the 
decision received almost no press coverage.10 
Yet contrasted with the interpretive approaches developed from the 
founding through the 1970s, the analysis on display in Mount 
Lemmon is a far cry from the once-commonplace, ubiquitous method 
of interpreting statutes by distilling legislative intent through review 
of a variety of sources, including the statutes themselves and 
legislative history.11  Examining the disparity in methodology at 
different time periods, the Court—albeit composed differently—no 
longer appears to be doing the same thing.12  As between the epochs, 
the players seem to be competing in different games, all of whom 
most likely to lose if they take an intractable position from one era 
and apply it to another.13  Social differences between the 1970s and 
present day14 cannot explain these differences in full.  But one 
obvious agent of change, as Justice Kagan suggested at Harvard, is 
the difference in how the justices have shifted the locus of 
persuasion, and how zealous advocates have responded in kind.15      
This paper argues that Mount Lemmon is a sleeper decision that 
should receive greater appreciation and reflection because the method 
of statutory interpretation on display seemingly caped a transition of 
displacement from divining intent through a variety of sources—
including legislative history—to wholesale reliance on the statutory 
text.  That Mount Lemmon passed without comment shows how far 
textualism has come in 30 years.  In two parts, this article first 
introduces how textualism as an interpretative method began to shape 
10. See Edith Roberts, Wednesday Round-Up, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2018, 7:31 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/wednesday-round-up-447/.
11. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971);
Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298,
1302 (2018).
12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Legal Scholarship Highlight: Justice Scalia’s Textualist
Legacy, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2017, 10:48 AM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2017/11/legal-scholarship-highlight-justice-scalias-textualist-legacy/ (describing
different approaches to and interpretations of the idea of textualism over the years
amongst the judiciary).
14. See, e.g., Bob Cohn, 21 Charts That Explain American Values Today, ATLANTIC
(June 27, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/21-charts-that-
explain-american-values-today/258990/.
15. See Siegel, supra note 13; see also Ron Collins, Ask the Author: Chief Judge
Katzmann on Statutory Interpretation, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 27, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/ask-the-author-chief-judge-katzmann-on-
statutory-interpretation/.
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and take hold as a dominate approach to legal reasoning in the 
Supreme Court.16  This article then examines how appellate courts, 
without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s conclusive endorsement 
of textualism, have approached the question presented in Mount 
Lemmon.17  The final section studies Mount Lemmon and observes 
what the decision means for litigants.18  Mount Lemmon enshrines a 
break from decisions dating from the founding era through the 1970s, 
making risible in the Supreme Court usage of once-unexceptionable 
advocacy based on pragmaticism and extratextual considerations.  
The decision shows that, for the mine-run of cases, the interpretative 
process in the Supreme Court begins—and unless compelling reasons 
counsel otherwise—ends with the text.  The pendulum has swung, 
and the movement appears to have reached a near-apex resting point.  
Whether that resting point comes an inflection point toward 
something else remains unanswered.  Yet it should not be lost that 
Mount Lemmon delivered a viable progressive victory to aggrieved 
employees.19  So while textualism is generally extolled as a 
conservative appellation,20 the right arguments can, in some cases, 
produce victories no matter the cause.            
II. HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS SHIFTED IN ITS
INTERPRETIVE METHODS
A. Extratextual Sources Complement the Understanding of
Statutory Text
The Supreme Court long has been comfortable with relying on a 
variety of sources, including legislative history and other extratextual 
evidence, to interpret statutes.21  As early as 1816, the Supreme Court 
made clear that 
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Sections III.A–B.
18. See infra Section III.C.
19. See Mark Joseph Stern, The Gorsuch Brief, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:29 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/nielsen-preap-aclu-neil-gorsuch-
briefs.html; see also Howard Fischer, US Supreme Court Says Mount Lemmon Fire
District Can Be Sued for Age Discrimination, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://tucson.com/news/local/us-supreme-court-says-mount-lemmon-fire-district-
can-be/article_9ad583e2-0ccd-5bf6-a51b-d9d71dfc6804.html.
20. See Barbara Perry et al., In Trump’s Court Pick, Who Won?, CABLE NEWS NETWORK
(July 10, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10/opinions/trump-second-
supreme-court-pick-opinion-roundup/index.html.
21. Collins, supra note 15.
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In the construction of the statutory or local laws of a state, it 
is frequently necessary to re[fer] to the history and situation 
of the country, in order to ascertain the reason, as well as the 
meaning, of many of the provisions in them, to enable a 
court to apply, with propriety, the different rules for 
construing statutes.22  
In interpreting a North Carolina statute, the Court relied on “a 
legislative declaration, explaining and amending” the law at issue as 
well as “the history and situation of the country at that time.”23  The 
Court made clear in 1842 that “the journals of [C]ongress and of the 
state legislatures are evidence” when reviewing and interpreting 
statutes.24  In 1866, the Court reviewed drafting histories before 
concluding that “it was the intention of Congress to subject the sales 
made by brokers for themselves to the same duties as those made by 
them for others . . . though it must be admitted their intention is 
rather obscurely expressed.”25  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
accompanied by a unanimous court, found nothing untoward in 1911 
about using legislative history to understand “the mind of Congress” 
in order to interpret a statute.26  And by 1948, the Supreme Court 
regularly reviewed “‘legislative reports and debates’ so as ‘to 
indicate that the legislative mind.’”27 
So by the 1970s, the Supreme Court had arrived at the comfortable, 
accepted idea that interpreting statutes meant reviewing legislative 
intent through textual and extratextual considerations to arrive at a 
conclusion best serving the aims of the legislature, as understood 
through examination of those considerations.28  Lest there be any 
doubt, even in those cases highlighted in infamy for strident reliance 
on exogenous evidence,29 the text remained a salient tool of statutory 
interpretation.    
For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court heard Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, a dispute about a federal 
statute constraining the government’s ability to provide funding for 
highways through areas designated as public parks.30  Justice 
22. Preston v. Browder, 14 U.S. 115, 121 (1816).
23. Id. at 123.
24. Watkins v. Lessee of Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 56 (1842).
25. United States v. Cutting, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 441, 444 (1865).
26. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1911).
27. Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 418–20 (1948).
28. See Siegel, supra note 13.
29. See generally id.
30. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404–06 (1971).
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Thurgood Marshall offered an extensive review of the operative 
legislative history in the case before concluding that the Court’s 
analysis should focus “primarily” on the statutory text because of 
ambiguities among the committee reports.31  In agreeing with the 
government that the statute did not require the agency to provide 
formal findings of fact before expending federal funds, Justice 
Marshall never once suggested that reliance on the text was a last 
resort otherwise to be forgotten.32  That legislative history does not 
jettison the utility in reviewing the text was evident in Justice 
Marshall’s often misunderstood opinion.33  Although the decision 
was rife with discussions of and citations to certain legislative-history 
documents and evidence,34 along with the statutes themselves, 
nothing in the decision suggested that, as a default position, the text 
should be subordinate to extratextual evidence.  Dictionaries were not 
discussed.  Nor was the concept of common usage. 
Justice Marshall’s analysis, joined by all justices, was couched in 
terms of understanding “legislative intent,” but this phrase, at that 
time, embodied interpreting the text through various tools rather than 
attempting hermeneutics or some preternatural distillation of a 
collective truth.35  Although the phrase seems well-nigh pejorative 
now,36 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park encapsulates the current 
position championed by Chief Circuit Judge Robert A. Katzman, in 
which courts should consult extratextual sources to best understand 
“how Congress works” and “what the legislative branch thinks is 
important in understanding its statutes.”37  To do otherwise “impugns 
Congress’s work process.”38   
Toward the end of the decade, in another often-maligned case by 
those who now disfavor extratextual considerations,39 the Supreme 
Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York 
considered whether a municipality could be a “person” subject to 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.40  Justice William J. Brennan Jr., 
31. Id. at 412 n.29.
32. See id. at 410–20.
33. Siegel, supra note 13.
34. See generally Citizens, 401 U.S. at 406.
35. See generally id.
36. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783 n.* (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“For what it is worth, I seriously
doubt that a committee report is a ‘particularly reliable source’ for discerning
Congress’ intended meaning.’”).
37. Collins, supra note 15.
38. See id.
39. See Siegel, supra note 13.
40. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 662 (1978).
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writing for the Court, overruled precedent and concluded, after “[a] 
fresh analysis of the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,” that 
municipalities could be liable for civil-rights violations.41  The Court 
devoted twenty-five pages to recounting congressional debates on the 
issue, concluding that Congress “intend[ed]” municipalities to be 
covered.42  Still, the majority made plain that the analysis should 
“begin with the language of § 1983 as originally passed.”43  So, to 
Justice Brennan, text always has a role in any interpretive analysis, 
which cannot be divorced from other materials used to understand its 
meaning.44  Even in dissent, then-Justice William H. Rehnquist 
discussed and relied almost exclusively on legislative history and 
extratextual evidence to argue that municipalities cannot be liable for 
civil-rights violations.45  No justice brought up dictionaries or 
common usage.  
B. Legislative History Cannot Be Trusted
Although ascribing the success of a movement to any individual is
fraught and generally overlooks the contributions of others, at least 
on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia was one of the first to challenge 
the efficacy of reviewing legislative history and extratextual 
documents.46  And, as one of his many contributions during a nearly 
thirty-year tenure on the Supreme Court, his arguments eventually 
displaced as “almost unimaginable today” roughly two hundred years 
of practice in arguments and decision-making.47  Justice Scalia’s 
approach, most frequently referred to as textualism,48 has in effect 
erased time and experience.  
41. Id. at 664–65.
42. Id. at 665–90.
43. Id. at 691.
44. See, e.g., id.
45. See, e.g., id. at 720–23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. See Siegel, supra note 13.
47. See id.
48. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 030: Textualism, LEGAL 
THEORY LEXICON: LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 21, 2018), https://lsolum.typepad.com/
legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_theory_le_3.html; Lawrence B. Solum, Legal
Theory Lexicon 078: Theories of Statutory Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL 
THEORY LEXICON: LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Dec. 2, 2018), https://lsolum.typepad.com/
legal_theory_lexicon/2017/05/theories-of-statutory-interpretation.html; Kevin Walsh,
Tribute: Justice Scalia and the Next Generation of Constitutional Custodians,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/
tribute-justice-scalia-and-the-next-generation-of-constitutional-custodians/.
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In Blanchard v. Bergeron, Justice Scalia questioned in 1989 the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history on grounds that 
legislative reports are unreliable and misleading guides to legislative 
intent.49  In a separate opinion joined by no other justice, Justice 
Scalia argued that committee reports had become “increasingly 
unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually 
had in mind,” thereby implicitly accepting that a court should care to 
some degree what members of Congress had in mind.50  He also 
made plain his disdain for the prospect of a judicial practice that 
motivates congressional staffers to pad the record with biased 
evidence: 
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of 
congressional committee reports is well aware, the 
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee 
staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a 
committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-
lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not 
primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill 
meant (for that end Johnson would not merely have been 
cited, but its 12 factors would have been described, which 
they were not), but rather to influence judicial construction.  
What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know 
that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can 
transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully 
to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.51 
A few years later, in Conroy v. Aniskoff, Justice Scalia honed this 
argument: “The greatest defect of legislative history is its 
illegitimacy.  We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of 
legislators.”52  His solo opinion did cite four legislative-history 
excerpts “unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom [he] assigned the 
task.”53  Yet Justice Scalia leveled his view that when “language of 
the statute is entirely clear,” legislative history should not be 
consulted because “if [the clear result] is not what Congress meant 
then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct 
49. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
50. Id. at 99.
51. Id. at 98–99.
52. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
53. Id. at 527.
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it.”54  The “hapless law clerk” to whom he assigned the case later 
surfaced, remarking that reviewing legislative history was “beneath” 
the justices as well as “work hardly fit even for a hapless law 
clerk.”55   
Justice Scalia crystalized his thoughts on textualism in 1995 
through a series of lectures delivered at Princeton University, which 
later appeared in book form.56  He complained about reliance of 
legislative history, but that was one piece in a larger mosaic: “[T]he 
text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”57 
Years later, Bilski v. Kappos, a 2010 case about whether a business 
method can constitute a patentable “process,” instantiated a model for 
textualism through its adoption by the other justices.58  Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the Court, declined to address the 
history, policies, and background understandings of the patent 
system, focusing instead on “dictionary definitions” and “common 
usage” to understand the word “process.”59  The only reference to 
legislative history came from a concurrence in judgment authored by 
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor.60  
As textualism gained traction in the Supreme Court, the usage of 
canons of statutory construction (i.e., generalized precepts to assist in 
reading statutes) seemed to shift, turning the lens through which the 
text is viewed from extratextual policy concerns to mantras like “the 
people may rely on the original meaning of the written law.”61  A 
five-justice majority during October Term 2017 seemed to capture 
the zeitgeist of the moment with this statement: “Written laws are 
meant to be understood and lived by.  If a fog of uncertainty 
54. Id. at 528.
55. John Duffy, Tribute: Justice Scalia’s Hapless Law Clerk, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6,
2016, 11:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/tribute-justice-scalias-hapless-
law-clerk/.
56. See Siegel, supra note 13.
57. Id.
58. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 598, 602 (2010).
59. Id. at 601–03.
60. See id. at 641–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
61. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018); Encino Motorcars,
LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (“We reject this principle as a useful
guidepost for interpreting the FLSA.  Because the FLSA gives no ‘textual indication’
that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, ‘there is no reason to give [them]
anything other than a fair (rather than a “narrow”) interpretation.’” (citation omitted)).
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surrounded them, if their meaning could shift with the latest judicial 
whim, the point of reducing them to writing would be lost.”62 
As Bilski and later decisions demonstrate, the hallmarks of a 
textualist opinion include resisting the temptation to find textual 
ambiguity, while eschewing legislative history, intent, pragmatism, 
historical context, and analogous or adjoining precedent; the opinion 
instead should follow a familiar path of reciting the text, analyzing 
grammar, referencing dictionaries, and briefly rebutting practical 
counterarguments against a conclusion already drawn from the 
proceeding analysis of foreordained clear text.63   
President Donald J. Trump has accelerated the role of textualism as 
the principal driver in statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court 
by making it part of a litmus test for any nominee.64  Justice Neil M. 
Gorsuch was not shy in attesting to his fealty to this approach as a 
circuit judge—even questioning outright whether legislative intent 
could ever be discerned.65  Nor was Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh 
timid in his views, espousing thoughts on occasion akin to Justice 
Scalia.66   
Despite textualism’s momentum in the Supreme Court, the federal 
courts of appeals have been slow adopters, and even skeptics, of a 
regimented approach to interpreting federal statutes.67  After 
surveying forty-two federal courts of appeals judges, Circuit Judge 
62. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2074.
63. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 1140 (citing a dictionary definition to
ascertain “ordinary meaning”).  See also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 368 (2018).
Our analysis starts with the phrase ‘critical habitat.’  According to 
the ordinary understanding of how adjectives work, ‘critical 
habitat’ must also be ‘habitat.’  Adjectives modify nouns—they 
pick out a subset of a category that possesses a certain quality.  It 
follows that ‘critical habitat’ is the subset of ‘habitat’ that is 
‘critical’ to the conservation of an endangered species. 
Id. 
64. Perry et al., supra note 20.
65. Kevin Russell, Judge Gorsuch on Separation of Powers and Federalism,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 15, 2017, 3:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-
gorsuch-separation-powers-federalism/ (“And guesses about legislative intentions are,
as we’ve seen, never a proper basis for overruling plain statutory language.”).
66. Edith Roberts, Potential Nominee Profile: Brett Kavanaugh, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2018, 5:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/potential-nominee-profile-brett-
kavanaugh/ (“Perhaps because of his years of executive-branch experience,
Kavanaugh generally brings a pragmatic approach to judging, although his judicial
philosophy is conservative, and he has applied principles of textualism and
originalism espoused by the late Justice Antonin Scalia.”).
67. Gluck & Posner, supra note 11, at 1343–48.
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Richard A. Posner and Professor Abbe R. Gluck found that none 
endorsed textualism outright and all consulted legislative history: 
None of the forty-two judges whom we interviewed—
judges from across the political and theoretical spectrum—
was willing to associate himself or herself with “textualism” 
without qualification.  All consult legislative history.  Many 
eschew dictionaries.  Many of them utilize at least some 
canons of construction, but for reasons that range from 
“window dressing,” to canons as vehicles of opinion 
writing, to a view that they are actually useful decision 
tools.68 
The authors also discovered that “the judges [they] spoke to are 
willing to consider many different kinds of material” because it is 
“defensible to gather as much information as you can to make the 
best-informed decision you can.”69 
Even so, as textualism has gained greater purchase in the legal 
mainstream, circuit splits have inevitably formed as this once-nascent 
movement cleaves newer decisions from those applying the methods 
of old.70  Mount Lemmon demonstrates how a circuit split can occur 
subtly through interpretative-regime displacement. 
III. MOUNT LEMMON AND THE TRIUMPH OF TEXTUALIST
DISPLACEMENT
A. How U.S. Circuit Courts Interpreted the ADEA Amid the Rise of
Textualism
In many ways, interpretations of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 grew up alongside the emergence of 
textualism.71  The ADEA sought to protect workers against “arbitrary 
age discrimination.”72  As originally enacted, both Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA “imposed liability on 
‘employer[s],’ defined in both statutes as ‘a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce’ whose employees met a numerical 
68. Id. at 1302.
69. Id.
70. See Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 25 (2018) (“Federal courts
have divided on this question.”).
71. See Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107,
1112–14 (2014).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).
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threshold,” all while excluding governmental entities from that 
definition and thus liability.73   
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to reach state and local 
employers with fifteen or more employees by changing the definition 
of who is a “person”: “The term ‘person’ includes one or more 
individuals, governments, governmental agencies, [and] political 
subdivisions.”74  The definition of “person” then rolled into the 
definition of “employer”: “The term ‘employer’ means a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees . . . .”75   
Congress amended the ADEA two years later to address its import 
on  state and local governments.76  But unlike Title VII, in which 
Congress added those entities to the definition of “person,” in the 
ADEA, Congress added them to the definition of “employer”:   
The term “employer” means a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 
employees . . . .  The term also means (1) any agent of such 
a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State . . 
. .77  
In that same 1974 enactment, Congress amended the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, on which parts of the ADEA had been modeled, to 
reach government employers regardless of their size.78  Running 
concurrent with the gradual acceptance of textualism, courts began to 
interpret whether the numerical requirement of twenty employees 
applied to state and local governments under the ADEA. 
 In 1986, the Seventh Circuit, in Kelly v. Wauconda Park District, 
concluded that the numerical requirement applied to state and local 
employers because “the legislative histories of both the ADEA and 
Title VII amendments indicate that Congress’s main purpose in 
amending the statutes was to put public and private employers on the 
same footing.”79  Circuit Judge Harlington Wood Jr. concluded that 
the statute is “ambiguous,” which compelled the appellate court to 
review holistically the text, various statements in the congressional 
record, and analogous precedent on how to interpret employment-law 
73. Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 24–25 (citations omitted).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976).
75. Id. § 2000e(b).
76. Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 25.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012).
78. See id. § 203(d) (2012).
79. Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1986).
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statutes.80  The decision was devoid of any evaluation of common 
usage, instead applying “common sense” to understand congressional 
intent.81  And although the panel made just one reference to a 
dictionary definition for the term “also,” it explained that “there are 
dangers in attempting to rely too heavily on characterizations such as 
‘disjunctive’ form versus ‘conjunctive’ form to resolve difficult 
issues of statutory construction.”82  Judge Wood concluded with a 
pragmatic argument that nothing in the legislative history suggested 
that Congress sought to impose greater liability for age 
discrimination, as compared to the numerically restricted areas of 
racial, sexual, and religious discrimination under Title VII.83 
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in 1990, observing 
that the text is “ambiguous” and that “the legislative history of the 
statute indicates that the twenty employee statutory minimum 
applicable to private employers is likewise applicable to government 
employers.”84  Circuit Judge James Leo Ryan was succinct:  
The legislative history clearly expresses the intention that 
public sector employees are to be treated the same as private 
sector employees for purposes of the ADEA and, therefore, 
since the twenty employee minimum applies to private 
sector employees, Congress must have intended the twenty 
employee minimum requirement to apply to public sector 
employees.85 
The decision contained no references to dictionaries, the concept of 
common usage, or grammatical considerations. 
Eight years later, the Eight Circuit joined these ranks, concluding 
that the statute is “ambiguous” and that “[t]he legislative history of § 
630(b)(2) shows that in adding agencies and instrumentalities to the 
ADEA definition of an employer, Congress intended to ‘treat both 
public and private employers alike, with “one set of rules”’ applying 
to both.”86 
80. See id. 270–72.
81. See id. at 272–73.
82. Id. at 270 n.1 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 273.
84. EEOC v. Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 360, 361 (6th Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 363.
86. Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
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In 2015, the Tenth Circuit, relying on these precedents, accepted 
the numerical requirement in a footnote without much discussion.87  
Rather than reciting legislative history or other extratextual evidence, 
Chief Circuit Judge Timothy Tymkovich “adopt[ed] that view” 
simpliciter, acknowledging that the other appellate decisions were 
“based on legislative history showing a general intent to treat 
government and private employers the same.”88 
Although the analysis varied over time, a circuit split did not 
emerge until 2017, when the Ninth Circuit, perennially maligned by 
President Trump for ostensibly “liberal” outcomes,89 adopted a 
textualist approach to understanding the ADEA.90    
B. Textualist Displacement on Display
Mount Lemmon has its genesis in a decision by the fire chief of
Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, to 
lay off its two oldest fulltime firefighters, John Guido (then 46) and 
Dennis Rankin (then 54) to resolve a budget shortfall.91  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, which long had maintained 
that the ADEA covers state and local employers of any size, found 
reasonable cause to believe that the fire district had discriminated on 
the basis of age.92  So the firefighters sued in 2013 on allegations that 
the fire district violated the ADEA.93  In view of the uniform 
consensus among appellate courts in other circuits, the district court 
unsurprisingly granted summary judgment to the fire district on the 
basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the 
ADEA.94 
Against a redoubt of unbroken precedent in one direction, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in 2017, 
87. See Cink v. Grant Cty., 635 F. App’x 470, 474 n.5 (10th Cir. 2015).
88. Id.
89. Lyle Denniston, Chief Justice, President in a Public Feud, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Nov.
22, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/chief-justice-president-in-a-public-feud
(“The President has been regularly a critic of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which has a reputation of being the most liberal tribunal in the federal court
system.”).
90. See Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (“As a
matter of plain meaning, the argument that § 630(b) can be reasonably interpreted to
include its second sentence definitions within its first is underwhelming.”).
91. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 24 (2018).
92. Charlotte Garden, Argument Preview: Age Discrimination and Small Public
Employers, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24, 2018, 1:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/09/argument-preview-age-discrimination-and-small-public-employers/.
93. Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170.
94. Id.
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concluding that the ADEA is “not ambiguous,” and that “[t]he 
twenty-employee minimum does not apply to definitions in the 
second sentence and there is no reason to depart from the statute’s 
plain meaning.”95  Writing for the panel, Senior Circuit Judge 
Diarmuid O’Scannlain recited dictionary definitions to arrive at an 
understanding that the word “‘also’ is a ‘term of enhancement,’” 
which means it “adds another definition to a previous definition of a 
term—it does not clarify the previous definition.”96  “As a matter of 
plain meaning,” Judge O’Scannlain continued, “the argument that § 
630(b) can be reasonably interpreted to include its second sentence 
definitions within its first is underwhelming.”97  The appeals court 
also rejected any notion that “common sense” should apply in this 
type of analysis because “any appeal to congressional intent is a non-
sequitur” that does not “affect the determination of whether a 
statute’s plain meaning is ambiguous.”98  Judge O’Scannlain’s brief 
discussion of legislative history only occurred at the end of the 
opinion in a section serving as an alternative basis to support the 
panel’s textualist conclusion.99  The Ninth Circuit concluded by 
observing that “it is not our role to choose what we think is the best 
policy outcome and to override the plain meaning of a statute, 
apparent anomalies or not.”100  This counterintuitive result, when 
measured against judicial consensus reaching the opposite 
conclusion, bears all the hallmarks of an instance of textualist 
displacement.        
The fire district thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari on 
the issue of numerosity, which the Supreme Court granted to the 
Ninth Circuit in February 2018.101  The briefs on the merits focused 
on how the text of the ADEA and other statutes support their 
positions.102  With the support of the U.S. Solicitor General, the 
firefighters argued that the term “also” creates three unambiguous 
groups of employers subject to liability: “private employers with at 
least [twenty] employees; their agents; and state and local employers 
95. Id. at 1174 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 1171.
97. Id. at 1173.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1174–75.
100. Id. at 1175.
101. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138
S. Ct. 1165 (Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 17-587).
102. See Garden, supra note 92.
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of any size.”103  The fire district countered that “also” acts as “a 
transitional phrase that signifies amplification or clarification,” rather 
than defining a wholly new category of employer.104  The fire district 
added that including “agents” as an independent category of 
“employer” is “unfathomable” because that would impose 
independent liability on those individuals.105  Maintaining 
consistently between Title VII and the ADEA furthers congressional 
goals in this area, the fire district continued, which provides a space 
for large-office accountability without the threat of impairing small-
employer operations.106  Professor Charlotte Garden suggested ahead 
of oral argument that “[t]he fire district’s main challenge seems likely 
to be convincing the court to look beyond the most intuitive reading 
of [the statutory] words.”107 
The Court heard the case on the first day of October Term 2018.108  
An eight-member bench assembled due to the vacancy created by 
Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the pending confirmation of Justice 
Kavanaugh.109  E. Joshua Rosenkranz, whose name was initially 
misspelled “Rosenberg” in the Court’s day call for arguing 
lawyers,110 represented the fire district and faced tough questioning 
on all sides.111  Justice Gorsuch suggested that it made no sense to 
deviate from the “normal meaning” of the word “also.”112  Both 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Sotomayor made clear 
that they shared this view.113  In contrast, Jeffrey Fisher, representing 
the firefighters, and Jonathan Bond, arguing on behalf of the 
government, encountered little resistance for the proposition that 
“also” is used in both everyday conversation and federal statutes to 






108. Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: Opening with an Empty Spot on the




111. Charlotte Garden, Argument Analysis: “A Strange Statute that was Written in a
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that “[t]his is a strange statute that was written in a strange way.”115  
But, as Professor Garden predicted, “[a]n outcome that relies on a 
plain-language reading of ‘also means’ to decide the case in the 
employees’ favor seems likely.”116 
C. Mount Lemmon Embodies the Court’s Shift in Thinking on
Statutory Interpretation
In the first opinion of October Term 2018, just over one month 
after oral argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Ninth Circuit, concluding that “the text of the ADEA’s definitional 
provision, also its kinship to the FLSA and differences from Title 
VII, leave scant room for doubt that state and local governments are 
‘employer[s]’ covered by the ADEA regardless of their size.”117  In a 
slip opinion barely crossing over onto a seventh page, Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous eight-member bench, emphasized 
that “[f]irst and foremost, the ordinary meaning of ‘also means’ is 
additive rather than clarifying.”118  Hewing to the text, she explained 
that it would be “so strange” to impose a numerical requirement in 
one portion of the sentence for governments, while declining to do 
the same for agents in the other portion: “Its construction, however, 
would lift that restriction for the agent portion of the second sentence, 
and then reimpose it for the portion of that sentence addressing States 
and their political subdivisions.”119 
Rejecting arguments that Title VII and the ADEA should have 
uniform application, Justice Ginsburg commented that “this disparity 
is a consequence of the different language Congress chose to 
employ.”120  “The better comparator is the FLSA,” she observed, 
which defines states and political subdivisions as “employer[s]” 
irrespective of their number of employees.121  The Court made slight 
reference to some practical concerns in the opinion’s penultimate 
paragraph, suggesting that “experience” evinced “[n]o untoward 
service shrinkages” from the threat of liability.122  And the opinion 
made no mention of common-sense arguments, legislative history 
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 27 (2018).
118. Id. at 25.
119. Id. at 26.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 26–27.
122. Id. at 27.
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(despite its extensive reliance by circuit courts for decades), the 
historical context of the ADEA and Title VII, or congressional intent.  
Mount Lemmon generated little coverage, scholarly or otherwise.123  
One article suggested that smaller school districts could be 
impacted.124  Another, written by an amicus curiae in support of the 
fire district, remarked that the Court rejected its “policy arguments” 
that rural areas could become vulnerable to litigation because “few 
alternatives [exist] to layoffs and terminations when budget cuts must 
be made.”125  The overwhelming consensus was that Mount Lemmon 
was a workmanlike decision with little on which to comment.126   
That Mount Lemmon received little fanfare proves just how far 
textualism has come, and at least three reasons demonstrate why the 
decision bears latent, almost sub rosa, importance.  Most striking is 
how different the Court approached the question presented in Mount 
Lemmon when compared to courts just a few years ago.  In the 
context of the ADEA, thirty years of precedent had concluded that 
the numerical requirement was ambiguous, necessitating review of 
extratextual sources.127  What changed in 2018?  Certainly different 
judges and justices are deciding the cases, but a lack of bald 
ideological valance in Mount Lemmon suggests that the method of 
interpretation mattered and is cardinal.  As compared to Monell and 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, the style and methodology 
employed in Mount Lemmon could not be more divergent.128  An 
educated person without legal training most likely would conclude 
that the Court had been asked to do different things, which required 
performing different tasks.  Nothing about those cases, or the court of 
appeals cases leading up to Mount Lemmon, maps onto how the 
123. Roberts, supra note 10.
124. Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Says Federal Age-Bias Law Applies to Local
Governments of Any Size, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 6, 2018, 1:08 PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2018/11/supreme_court_rules_that_feder
.html (“Most school districts tend to be quite large employers in their communities.
But some regular districts with fewer than 20 employees likely exist, as do certain
administrative or special-purpose school districts that may have light employment
rosters.”).
125. Lisa Soronen, Supreme Court Rules Against State and Local Governments in Age
Discrimination Case, COUNCIL STATE GOV’T. (Nov. 6, 2018, 3:17 PM), http://know
ledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/supreme-court-rules-against-state-and-local-
government-age-discrimination-case.
126. Roberts, supra note 10.
127. Compare Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–12 (1971),
with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664–65 (1978).
128. Compare Citizens, 401 U.S. at 411–12, and Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–65, with Mount
Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 23 (2018).
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Supreme Court approached its decision in 2018.  Gone are references 
to intent, non-final legislative documents, practical considerations, 
and a wink to common sense.  All of that has been replaced by 
grammar exegeses and dictionary citations.129  Although the text 
played a role before, it is now the germane player on a team in a 
game that has evolved apace in just thirty years.  And while some 
have questioned whether the Supreme Court can prescribe a certain 
method of statutory interpretation that would be binding on the lower 
courts, it does not need to if it in effect ignores extratextual 
arguments in favor of preferred methods.130    
The second lesson of Mount Lemmon is how advocates must 
approach statutory-interpretation cases in the Supreme Court.131  
Textualism forces, as the primary (and perhaps only) argument, an 
explanation about why the text supports a particular position.132  
Although the reasoning of similar precedent holds currency, reciting 
dictionary definitions is nigh mandatory in the Supreme Court in 
these types of cases.  Also, an understanding of how basic 
grammatical principles affect an argument is invaluable.133  
Referencing canons of statutory construction, particularly those 
identified in Reading Law by Justice Scalia and Professor Bryan 
Garner,134 can help salve the edges of an argument, especially when 
an argument is supported by the maxim “words generally should be 
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning 
129. See Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 23.
130. Gluck & Posner, supra note 11 at 1343–48.
131. See Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 25–26.
132. See id. at 26–27.
133. See, e.g., Jennifer Chacon, Argument Analysis: Are There Limits to the Government’s
Power to Detain Immigrants Without a Hearing?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2018, 7:37
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-analysis-are-there-limits-to-the-
governments-power-to-detain-immigrants-without-a-hearing/.
But an entertaining exchange between Gorsuch and Wang about 
grammar (in which Wang won kudos from the justice) suggested 
that Gorsuch has at least some sympathy for Preap’s statutory 
construction argument, even if he is not yet completely 
convinced.  And when Gorsuch pressed Tripp on whether there 
were ‘any limits on the government’s power’ under the 
government’s reading of the statute, it was reminiscent of the 
concerns about government overreach that Gorsuch signaled last 
term in Sessions v. Dimaya, in which he also came down in favor 
of the immigrant. 
Id. 
134. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247–340 (2012).
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. . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.”135  Extratextual canons 
on the other hand, such as the presumption that exemptions from 
complying with fair-labor practices should be construed narrowly,136 
seem to be losing favor in the Supreme Court, unless the dispute 
involves upholding the primacy of the Federal Arbitration Act over 
other laws and practices.137  
Anticipating a reluctance to find ambiguity perforce leaves a small 
window to argue away from the text.  And if the text does not support 
a favored position, good reasons must exist to resort to external 
documents and intent-laden arguments.  Perhaps pragmatism and 
consequentialism still have value in the appropriate context, as when 
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, salvaged a statute of immense 
national economic importance: “Congress passed the Affordable 
Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.  
If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent 
with the former, and avoids the latter.”138  Still, in the ordinary case, 
extratextual arguments fall behind the predetermined attention that 
the text now demands.139  No doubt if it were possible to transport 
and swap advocates from the 1970s with today, both sets would be 
ill-equipped to advance arguments in what assuredly would be a 
foreign place.  With the stakes just as high, the game probably would 
not make a dram of sense to either side.  But when, as now, the Court 
135. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (quotation marks
omitted) (ellipses omitted) (citation omitted).
136. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (“We reject this
principle as a useful guidepost for interpreting the FLSA.  Because the FLSA gives no
‘textual indication’ that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, ‘there is no
reason to give [them] anything other than a fair (rather than a “narrow”)
interpretation.’” (citation omitted)).
137. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648–49 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
If these untoward consequences stemmed from legislative 
choices, I would be obliged to accede to them.  But the edict that 
employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only one-
by-one does not come from Congress.  It is the result of take-it-or-
leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called ‘yellow 
dog,’ and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those 
unbargained-for agreements.  The FAA demands no such 
suppression of the right of workers to take concerted action for 
their ‘mutual aid or protection.’ 
Id. 
138. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
139. See supra notes 117–32 and accompanying text.
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gives you textualism, saddle in because “we’re all textualists” at that 
point.140   
A third lesson from Mount Lemmon is that textualism can 
sometimes produce progressive outcomes.  Assuming progressive 
values support empowering those aggrieved of employment 
discrimination with the ability to litigate against a broader range of 
employers, Mount Lemmon achieved that goal by affording the 
firefighters an opportunity to bring their case.141  The displacement of 
a panoply of extratextual sources in favor of reliance on text alone, to 
be sure, changes the game significantly in most circumstances—but 
the upshot for progressives is not necessarily transitioning from the 
tennis court to a rendezvous in the gladiatorial coliseum.  A more apt 
analogy might be, in close cases, like changing sports from basketball 
to baseball.  Michael Jordon had marginal success in his attempt to 
play baseball in the minor leagues, but he still played ball and hit a 
homerun three times.142  So obvious value exists for progressives to 
adopt a fake-it-until-you-make-it attitude on textualism.143  It is 
moreover too soon to tell how textualism, once properly embraced by 
litigants in their briefing, will affect litigation.  Also, although the 
wind is at textualism’s back right now, there is no guarantee that a 
shift in direction could not be in the offing.144  And when all else 
fails, as Justice Brennan commended during a speech at the Playboy 
Great Gorge Resort in Vernon, New Jersey, litigants can always try 
their luck in state court under state law.145   
Mount Lemmon, all told, makes manifest that textualism matters 
now more than ever.  And this abrupt change of circumstances, at 
least when compared to how courts have approached cases from the 
140. See The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
supra note 1.
141. Cf. Ronald Collins, Ask the Author: Adler and Others on “Business and the Roberts
Court,” SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2016, 4:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/11/ask-the-author-adler-and-others-on-business-and-the-roberts-court/; Roselyn
Miller, Seattle Considers a Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, SLATE (June 29, 2018,
10:00 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/06/domestic-workers-bill-of-rights-
in-seattle-is-most-progressive-attempt-at-protection-yet.html.
142. See Michael Jordan, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/reg
ister/player.fcgi?id=jordan001mic (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
143. See Stern, supra note 19.
144. See In Recess #9: “Hoofbeats in the Distance,” FIRST MONDAYS (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://simplecast.com/s/3076452a.
145. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Justice William Brennan and Supreme
Court Avoidance, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 21, 2018, 2:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2018/11/scotus-for-law-students-justice-william-brennan-and-supreme-court-
avoidance/.
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founding through the 1970s, deserves respect and is here to stay for 
the foreseeable future.  
IV. CONCLUSION
If “we’re all textualists now,” Mount Lemmon helps us understand
the breadth and scope of that charge.146  Yet Mount Lemmon also 
represents a validation of a cause and a recognition of what types of 
arguments now matter to the Supreme Court and what has become de 
minimis.147  Whether halcyon days are ahead or left in the past 
depends, at least partially, on whether you are an optimist or 
pessimist.  No doubt leading an argument headfirst with legislative 
history is a poor decision.  And ignoring the particularities of 
grammar comes at one’s peril.148  Still, although today’s opinions 
look nothing like opinions from, frankly, the past 200 years, the 
playing field can still produce victories for progressives bracing the 
textualist revolution.149  Each revolution is a product of its 
predecessor’s demise.  And whether one revolution has staying 
power over another depends, in some circumstances, on the ability to 
persuade and attract acceptance.  Textualism started with solo 
concurrences.150  For those not troubled by learning about a statute 
through as many sources as possible before reaching a decision, 200 
years of precedent provides a reference point from which to 
reinvigorate the debate—even if done one case at a time.   
146. See The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
supra note 1.
147. See supra Part I.
148. See, e.g., Chacon, supra note 133.
149. See Stern, supra note 19.
150. See supra Section II.B.
